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Executive Summary
In 1998, the Swedish parliament passed pension
legislation that transformed SwedenÕs Social Se c u r i t y
system to a Notional Defined Contribution (NDC) plan Ñ
that is, a defined contribution plan financed on a pay-as-
you-go basis.  In addition, the legislature established a
second tier of funded benefits.  This issue in brief
describes the evolution of the new Swedish pension
system and discusses its implications for other countries
considering pension reform.
The Need for Reform
The old Swedish Social Security system provided a flat-
rate benefit to ensure income security in old age and a
supplementary old-age pension to provide an earnings-
related pension.  The old Social Security system had
several problems:
¥     Sensitive to changes in economic growth.  The flat-rate
and earnings-related pension benefits, as well as the
earned pension rights, were indexed to follow prices
rather than wages.  Therefore, in times of rapid
economic growth the relative value of pension benefi t s
declined.  On the other hand, in times of negative
growth, pension rights and benefits rose faster than
contributions.   
¥     Principle of compensation for loss of income had
eroded.  Indexation to prices also meant that in times of
real wage growth successively larger proportions of the
population earned the maximum pension benefit.  
At some point, the earnings-related pension would
have become a flat-rate benefi t .
¥     Unsystematic and inequitable distribution of contribu-
tions and benefits.  Contributions were paid on all
earnings during a workerÕs lifetime, while benefits were
only based on the 15 years with highest earnings.  This
policy redistributed income from those with long
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low-income workers) to those with shorter work
histories and rising earnings (typically high-
income workers).  
¥     Labor market distortions.  The benefi t
formula implied that reducing labor force
participation did not necessarily translate into
lower pension benefits.  
The New Pension System
The reform process began in 1991 when
Parliament appointed a group to propose how 
to reform the current pension system.  It was
important that the proposal have broad political
support so that the new system would be insulated
against future changes.  Because of the need for
consensus, the group faced strong pressures to
find a compromise.  The proposal was presented 
in 1994 and passed Òin principleÓ by Pa r l i a m e n t .
Between 1994 and the spring of 1998, a Òworking
g r o u pÓ was assigned to work on the details of the
reform and write the proposal into law.
The objective for the pension reformers was 
to design a fiscally sustainable pension system tied
to economic growth with a clear link between con-
tributions and benefits.   The reformers wanted 
a system in which the contribution rate could
remain unchanged in the long run.  It was also
important that the system continue to be a public,
mandatory system.  The new pension system is a
d e fined contribution system financed primarily on
a pay-as-you-go basis but with a funded component.  
Under the new system, the income pension w i l l
replace the current earnings-related pension.  The
income pension will be a defined contribution
scheme with a contribution rate of 18.5 percent: 
16 percent of earnings will be credited to a
Ò n o t i o n a lÓ account and the remaining 2.5 percent
will be contributed to an individual account.  The
retirement age will be flexible; benefits can be 
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paid out starting at age 61, and at retirement the
account balance will be converted to an annuity.
B e n e fits will be indexed to life expectancy for
successive cohorts of retirees.  For individuals with
no or low pensions, the pension system will
provide a guarantee pension.  Unlike the current
flat-rate benefit, the guarantee pension will be
means-tested and offset by the income pension.  
Will the Reform Achieve Its Goals? 
Financial Stability.  The long-term fi n a n c i a l
stability in the system is ensured by linking earned
pension rights to economic growth and by linking
b e n e fits to life expectancy.  Ho w e v e r, the system is
still a pay-as-you-go system; the government has 
to cover its pension liability through annual con-
tributions.  This makes the system sensitive to
changes in the relative size of cohorts.  Increasing
the contribution rate is not a viable option in the
NDC framework since it automatically increases
b e n e fit promises proportionately.  This differs
from the United StatesÕ situation where benefits 
go up less than proportionately because of the
progressive benefit formula.  
Fairness and Redistribution.  The notional defi n e d
contribution system creates a clear link between
contributions and benefits.  In contrast to the old
system, benefits in the new pension system are
determined by lifetime contributions.  Ho w e v e r,
for workers in the lower half of the wage distribu-
tion, the link between contributions and benefits is
blurred because of the offset between the income
pension and the guarantee pension.  
Redistribution is an important goal in
S w e d e nÕs pension policy.  The guarantee pension
ensures income security for individuals with no 
or low incomes.  At the same time, the system
redistributes income from high earners by putting
a ceiling on earnings used in determining benefi t s
but levying the employer payroll tax on full
earnings.  Co n c l u s i o n
The design of the Swedish pension is new and,
following Sweden, several other countries have
adopted similar systems.  Is the NDC plan a model
to follow?
Transition.  The new pension system is tied 
to economic growth, making it financially stable 
in the long run.  Ho w e v e r, it does not solve the
financial pressures associated with the retirement
of the large baby boom generation since the
system is still financed on a pay-as-you-go basis.
The transition to the new pension system is made
possible by the fact that Sweden has accumulated
large reserves in order to meet pension obligations
for the baby boom generation.
B e n e fits.  Pension benefits in the NDC plan are
determined by how much is contributed over the
lifetime.  The focus on contributions makes the
b e n e fit side less transparent in the new pension
system.  Benefits are indexed to life expectancy and
as individuals live longer, annual benefits will be
lower for a given retirement age.  This means that
individuals will have to work longer and save more
on their own to provide for retirement.
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Information and Education.  Overall, the new
system puts more responsibility on individuals to
plan and prepare for retirement.  Information and
education therefore become important components
of the system.
Funded Component.  The new system includes a
funded pillar in which individuals can direct their
own investments.  Since the funded pillar is small,
it will be crucial for the system to be efficient and
administrative costs to be low.  A new government
a g e n c y, the Premium Pension Agency, will administer
the funded pillar.  The agencyÕs operation and
costs will provide important lessons on the
possibility of introducing a funded pillar of 
this size.
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On June 8, 1998 the Swedish Parliament passed
pension legislation that transformed SwedenÕ s
Social Security system to a Notional Defi n e d
Contribution (NDC) planÑthat is, a defi n e d
contribution plan financed on a pay-as-you-go
( P AYG) basis.  In addition, the legislature
established a second tier of funded benefits.  The
new pension system went into effect in 1999 with
the first benefit payments scheduled in 2001.
During a transition period, benefits will be paid
both from the old and the new systems.
As in many other countries, reform discus-
sions were motivated by the aging of the popula-
tion.  The Swedish system was also sensitive to
economic growth.  The reform process began 
in 1991 when Parliament appointed a group to
propose how to reform the current pension
system.  It was important that the proposal have
broad political support so that the new system
would be insulated against future changes, and,
because of the need for consensus, the group faced
strong pressures to find a compromise.  The
proposal was presented in 1994 and passed Òin
principleÓ by Parliament.  Between 1994 and the
spring of 1998, a Òworking groupÓ was assigned 
to work on the details of the reform and write the
proposal into law.  
This issue in brief describes the evolution of 
the new Swedish pension system.  The first section
outlines the old pension system and discusses the
need for a reform.  The next section describes the
reform process and a discussion of the features of
the new pension system follows.  The paper con-
cludes with a discussion of the implications of
S w e d e nÕs reform for other countries considering
pension reform.
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The Social Security System 
The retirement income system in Sweden consists
of two parts: public national pensions (So c i a l
Security) that cover all individuals, and pensions
that build on contractual agreements between the
labor market organizations (negotiated or
occupational pensions) similar to private pensions
in the United States.
1 Social Security is a public
scheme that covers all Swedish residents.  The old
Social Security system provided a flat benefi t
(introduced in 1913) to ensure income security in
old age and a supplementary old-age pension
(introduced in 1960) to provide an earnings-related
p e n s i o n .
2   Separately from the Social Se c u r i t y
system, municipalities provide a means-tested
supplementary housing allowance.  The following
discussion focuses on the public Social Se c u r i t y
p r o g r a m .
Benefits 
The flat benefit (FP) was intended to provide basic
support during retirement, while the
supplementary old-age pension benefit (ATP) was
designed to replace lost income.  The ATP benefi t
is based on an individualÕs 15 years of highest
earnings, requires 30 years of labor force partici-
pation for a full pension, and replaces 60 percent
of earnings up to a ceiling.  Individuals with no or
very low ATP received an additional benefit, the
pension supplement, which was about 50 percent
of the FP benefit.  
B e n e fits, as well as wages on which pension
rights were computed, were indexed for inflation.
B e n e fits are taxed as regular income, although
individuals with low pension income used to
receive an extra deduction.  The normal retirement 
age was 65, but, with an actuarial adjustment,
b e n e fits could be postponed until age 70 or
withdrawn early from age 60.  Partial retirement
1 There are four main negotiated plans: for national government
workers; for local government workers; for salaried (white-collar)
workers in the private sector; and for hourly-wage (blue-collar)
workers in the private sector.  Generally they replace 10-15
percent of income in addition to the public pensions, but most
of these plans also have provisions to cover income above the
Social Security ceiling.  The negotiated pensions are financed
through payroll taxes and, in the case of the plans for
government workers, through general tax revenues.
2 Prior to 1960, local and state employees had been covered by
earnings-related pensions, but there was no universal coverage.allowed workers to reduce the number of hours
worked and receive pension benefits in place of
lost earnings.  In addition to Social Se c u r i t y, most
working individuals are covered by negotiated
pensions, based on collective bargaining contracts
between employers and employees.  
Financing 
The FP and ATP benefits were financed primarily
through payroll taxes levied on the employer.  The
payroll taxes for the FP and ATP systems were 5.86
percent and 13 percent respectively in 1997
( National Social Insurance Board 1999).
3 T h e
financing for the FP benefit was supplemented by
general tax revenues.  Although pension rights are
earned only up to a ceiling, the payroll tax was
levied on the full income.  The ATP system is
basically a pay-as-you-go system but with some
partial funding.  When the ATP pension was
established in 1960, the level of contributions was
set higher than the rate needed to cover benefi t
payments in order to: (1) act as a buffer against
cyclical shifts in contributions; and (2) offset the
expected decrease in private saving following the
introduction of the ATP system.  The surplus in
the ATP system is held in reserve in the Na t i o n a l
Pension Funds (AP funds).
4 C u r r e n t l y, reserves
are about 40 percent of GDP; equivalent to
approximately five times annual ATP payments.  
The major part of these reserves (85 percent) 
is invested in low-risk assets, mainly government
bonds and housing bonds.  The nominal rate of
return on these assets was 6.7 percent in 1997.
The remainder of the reserves (15 percent) is
invested in equities through funds established
especially for this purpose in 1974.  Investments
are mainly in domestic equities; foreign
investments cannot exceed 10 percent of the
assets.  The overall rate of return on all funds was
9 percent in 1997 (Ministry of Finance 1998).
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The Need for Reform
The old Social Security system had several
p r o b l e m s :
¥     Sensitive to changes in economic growth.  T h e
pension benefits as well as the earned pension
rights were indexed to follow prices rather than
wages.  The absence of a link between benefi t s
and real wage growth of the working population
made the system sensitive to economic growth.
In times of rapid economic growth, the relative
value of pension benefits declined.  On the
other hand, in times of low or negative
productivity growth, the relative value of
b e n e fits increased since earned pension rights
and benefits rose faster than wages and
c o n t r i b u t i o n s .
¥     Principle of compensation for loss of income
had eroded.  Only income up to a ceiling counts
toward pension rights.  Since the ceiling was
indexed to follow consumer prices, real wage
growth meant that successively larger pro-
portions of the population earned wages above
the ceiling.  This meant that at some point, 
the ATP system would have become a flat-rate
b e n e fit and no longer a source for income
replacement.  Government estimates show 
that at two-percent real growth, approximately 
50 percent of all men and 20 percent of all
women would have had incomes above the
ceiling in 2020 (Ministry of Health and So c i a l
Affairs 1994).  
¥     Unsystematic and inequitable distribution of
contributions and benefits.  The connection
between contributions and benefits was weak.
Contributions were paid on all earnings during
the lifetime, while benefits were only based on
the 15 years with highest earnings.  This type 
of formula redistributes income from those 
with long working lives and flat life-cycle
income (typically low-income workers) to those
with shorter work histories and rising earnings
(typically high-income workers).  
3 In 1998, the levy of the payroll tax was changed in preparation
for the new pension system so that the tax is now levied equally
on employers and employees.  
4 Currently there are six AP funds, each with its own investment
board.  ¥     Labor market distortions.  The contribution 
to the basic pension was a pure tax since the
b e n e fit was paid irrespective of labor force
participation.  Since the ATP benefit was 
based on only 15 years of earnings, the AT P
contribution was a mix between tax and actual
contribution.  This meant that reducing labor
force participation did not necessarily translate
into lower pension benefits.  
¥     Weak incentives to save.  The PAYG system 
may reduce national saving, although this is 
an empirical question.  Studies for Sweden
(Sthlberg 1988) suggest that the pension
system has had a negative effect on the 
savings rate, even though the system is 
partially funded.
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The Reform Process 
The government appointed a commission (The
Pension Commission) in 1984 to study the So c i a l
Security system.  The Commission worked for the
rest of the decade, concluding that the Swedish
pension system was bound to run into serious
financial difficulties around 2020.  The
Commission presented its report in late 1990
making some proposals on how to reform the
system.  The Commission suggested keeping the
framework of the system unchanged, but
introducing indexation tied to economic growth
rather than prices.  The proposal also called for an
increase in the retirement age and longer labor
force attachment for a full pension (The Pe n s i o n
Commission 1990).
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In the elections in the fall of 1991, the So c i a l -
Democratic government was defeated and replaced
by a four-party non-Socialist government.  Pe n s i o n
reform became a high priority, and the new
government appointed a parliamentary group with
representatives of all seven parties then in the
Parliament.  The group, which was headed by the
Minister of Social Po l i c y, was organized along
rather unconventional lines for a Swedish public
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review body.  Membership was confined to the
parliamentary political parties; no representatives
of labor market organizations or retired peoplesÕ
associations were included.
7 The group used the
original Pension Co m m i s s i o nÕs report as a starting
point and employed experts and academics as well
as the National Social Insurance Board, the
Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, and the
Ministry of Finance to examine the issues.  
The group considered several alternatives.
One suggestion was to make changes along the
lines proposed by the original Pe n s i o n
Commission.  This suggestion was rejected
because it would have been only a temporary 
fix implying continued uncertainty about the
s y s t emÑit was deemed important to have a
pension system that was considered robust and
stable to political risk.  Another alternative was 
to introduce a fully-funded system, but the tax
increase required to build up such a system was
viewed as too large.
8 The group also discussed
whether the system should be privatized, a
proposal supported by the Conservatives, but the
Social-Democrats strongly argued to keep the
system public.  Because an important goal of the
reform process was to present a proposal for
reform that all parties could support, the group
faced strong pressures to find a compromise that
had broad support.  The non-Socialist parties were
also under pressure to avoid an argument over the
design of the pension system that could threaten
the stability of the government (Karlsson 1998).
The Pension Group presented its reform
proposal to Parliament in June 1994.  The new
system would remain pay-as-you-go but it would 
be based on contributions rather than benefits.  
It would continue to be a public system but also
include a small private individual account com-
ponent.  The reform proposal was supported by 
the four non-Socialist government parties and the
Social-Democratic opposition, comprising almost
90 percent of the Pa r l i a m e n t .
9
5 This result differs from some empirical studies.  For an
o v e r v i e w, see for example Engen and Gale (1997).  
6 The Commission suggested that benefits should be based on
the 20 years with highest earnings and that 40 years should be
required for a full benefit.
7 Although the labor market parties were not included in the
group, a Òreference groupÓ consisting of the different unions was
continuously briefed on the progress of the group.
8 To cover current pension liabilities, a fund would need to be
approximately three times GDP, and the institutional investors in
charge of the fund would be very powerful.
9 Two smaller parties, the Left Party and the New Liberals, did
not support the proposal.  The Social-Democrats regained power
in the fall of 1994.Parliament passed the proposal Òin principleÓ
and appointed a Òworking groupÓ to examine
unresolved issues and write the reform into law.
This group consisted of the five parties that were
behind the reform.  Not only did many diffi c u l t
issues need to be resolved, but also, during 1995,
the reform proposal was met with serious
opposition within the Social-Democratic party 
as many of the labor unions were against the
p r o p o s a l .
1 0 The Social-Democratic party did not
agree to support the pension reform until 1997,
which delayed the work on implementation.
Although the new system originally was scheduled
to go into effect in 1997, the Working Group did
not present the final reports until the spring of
1998, and Parliament did not pass the legislation
until June 8, 1998.  Because some remaining
issues had not been resolved, the Working Gr o u p
continued through 1999.  
The New Pension System
The objective for the pension reformers was 
to design a fiscally sustainable pension system 
tied to economic growth with a clear link between
contributions and benefits.  The reformers wanted
a system in which the contribution rate could
remain unchanged in the long run.  It was also
important that the system continue to be a public,
mandatory system.  The new pension system is a
d e fined contribution system financed primarily on
a pay-as-you-go basis but with a funded component
( Ministry of Health and Social Affairs 1994;
Palmer 1998; Scherman 1999; Sthlberg 1995).  
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The income pension will replace the current
earnings-related pension, ATP.  The income
pension will be a defined contribution scheme
with a contribution rate of 18.5 percent (levied
equally on employers and employeesÑthe
employee part will only be levied on income up to
the ceiling while the employer part will be levied
on the full income): 16 percent of earnings will be
credited to a ÒnotionalÓ account and the remaining
2.5 percent will be contributed to an individual
a c c o u n t .
1 1 An individual will earn pension rights
from labor income as well as from income from
transfers, such as unemployment insurance and
disability insurance.  In addition, individuals will
earn pension rights for years spent in the military
service and at home caring for small children.
Hence, the lifetime earnings profile will determine
b e n e fits.  The retirement age will be flexible;
b e n e fits can be paid starting at age 61, and at
retirement the account balance will be converted 
to an annuity.  
For individuals with no or low pensions, the
pension system will provide a guarantee pension.
The guarantee pension replaces the current FP
b e n e fit and pension supplement.  Unlike the FP
b e n e fit, the guarantee pension will be means-
tested and offset by the income pension.  It will 
be payable only from age 65.  The guarantee
pension will be funded completely from general
tax revenues.
1 0 In terms of the substantive issues, one of the biggest hurdles
was how to compensate workers for the increase in payroll taxes.
In the new system, the payroll tax was to be divided equally
between employers and employees, implying an increase for
e m p l o y e e s .
1 1 The notional account is a virtual account in which the workersÕ
contributions are recorded.  Each year the account balance is
increased by contributions and the rate of return.  The Notional Defined Contribution Plan
Contributions and Rate of Return on Ac c o u n t s .
Although the main part of the pension system will
continue to be a PAYG system, it was important
that contributions to the system determine the
level of benefits.  In order to achieve this goal,
each individual has a notional defined contribution
account to which 16 percent of earnings up to a
ceiling are credited.  The account balance grows
with annual ÒcontributionsÓ and the rate of return
on the account.  In order to link earned pension
rights to wage growth of the active population, the
rate of return is tied to per capita wage growth
through an index, the income index.
1 2
The goals were to ensure that earned pension
rights followed the growth in average wages for 
the active population, and that individualsÕ relative
income had the same effect on their pension
income irrespective of when they earned it during
their lifetime.
1 3 It was deemed that these goals
were best achieved by using per capita wage
growth rather than total wage growth as a measure
of the rate of return (Ministry of Health and So c i a l
Affairs 1998).  One disadvantage with an index
based on wage growth per capita, however, is 
that when the workforce decreases, benefits and
pension rights will grow faster than the contribu-
tion base from which benefits are paid.  
In order to deal with this possible instability,
the policymakers built a ÒbrakeÓ into the
indexation of the system.  The ÒbrakeÓ allows 
the indexation to be abandoned if the size of the
implicit pension debt exceeds a critical value.  
The critical value is the sum of the maximum
pension debt (the implicit debt calculated using 
an index based on total wage growth) and the




The administrative costs for the NDC will be
deducted from each individualÕs account balance.
1 5
Account balances for individuals who die before
retirement age will be distributed among the
individuals in the given cohort.  The account
balance will be adjusted on an annual basis for
each cohort.
Computation of Benefits at Retirement.  
Retirement benefits in the new pension system can
be withdrawn any time after age 61.  At retirement,
the balance in the notional account will be con-
verted to an annuity by dividing the balance by a
Òd i v i s i o nÓ number.  This number is determined by
average life expectancy at retirement for a given
cohort and an imputed real rate of return of 1.6
percent, which is both the projected long-run rate
of return and the expected real growth rate of the
e c o n o m y.  Since the annual pension benefit is
equal to the net present value of benefits using a
real interest rate of 1.6 percent, the initial pension
b e n e fit at retirement is higher than if benefi t s
were adjusted for economic growth each year.  The
annuity is equal for men and women.  No adjust-
ments will be made to benefits for changes in life
expectancy after age 65 even if the life expectancy
is adjusted up or down.
1 6
1 2 Two measures of wage growth were considered: (1) total wage
growth; and (2) per capita wage growth.
1 3 In order to smooth the effects of the business cycle, wage
growth is computed as a moving average over three years.
1 4 By the same token, if the system accumulates surpluses that
are Òtoo large,Ó the excess surplus will be distributed among the
p a r t i c i p a n t s .
1 5 Deduction of administrative costs will be phased into the
system since the first generations participate both in the old and
the new system.  Starting in 2021, 100 percent of administrative
costs will be deducted.  Administrative costs will be estimated by
the National Social Insurance Board and will be shown on the
annual statement sent to participants.  Currently, administrative
costs for the Social Security system are less than 1 percent of
annual contributions.  
1 6 If an individual retires before age 65, a preliminary division
number is used; the final division number is determined for each
cohort for the year the cohort turns 65.Post-retirement benefits will be adjusted each
year for inflation.  Since the initial benefit calcu-
lation already includes an implicit rate of return 
of 1.6 percent, the pension benefit will be price
indexed plus/minus the deviation from this growth
norm.  Table 1 provides an example of the index-
ation of post-retirement benefits.  If real wage
growth in the economy is equal to 1.6 percent,
pension benefits will be adjusted by the full price
increase (column 1).  Ho w e v e r, if growth falls
below the norm, pensioners will not be
compensated fully for price increases (column 2).
Table 1: Indexation of Pension Benefits after Retirement
Wage Growth: Equal to Less than Greater than
N o r m N o r m N o r m
( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 )
Real wage growth 1 . 6 % 0 . 5 % 2 . 5 %
Deviation from
1.6 percent 
growth norm 0 . 0 - 1 . 1 0 . 9
I n f l a t i o n 2 . 0 % 2 . 0 % 2 . 0 %
Pension benefits 
changed by 2 . 0 % 0 . 9 % 2 . 9 %
The Funded Co m p o n e n t
In addition to the NDC, 2.5 percent of earnings
will be contributed to a funded individual account.
The accounts are self-directed and the participants
can invest in domestic as well as international
funds.  A new government agency, the Premium
Pension Agency (PPM), will administer the 
funded pillar and will also be the sole provider of
annuities within the funded system.  Ho w e v e r, the
PPM will draw on the resources and administrative
structures already in place at other government
agencies.  
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The policymakers decided a new agency was
needed since the funded pillar would include a
broad range of new activities that would have been
d i f ficult to undertake within the realm of the
National Insurance Board.  In addition, a central
agency could keep administrative costs of the
funded pillar down by drawing on economies 
of scale in administration, such as collecting
contributions, recordkeeping, and providing infor-
mation to participants.  Experience with individual
accounts indicates that administrative costs can 
be very high, in particular when participants have
broad investment choices.
1 7
Contributions to the funded pillar will be
collected by the National Tax Au t h o r i t y.  In
preparation for the new pension system, this
agency has been collecting contributions since
1995; currently, contributions total approximately
50 billion crowns ($6.25 billion) and are projected
to exceed 500 billion ($65.5 billion) in 2020
(Premium Pension Agency 1999).  The funds are
invested in low-risk government bonds until
individual pension rights have been established.
Individual pension rights are established when
employer and employee tax statements have 
been consolidated, which takes an average of 
18 months.
1 8 When this consolidation occurs,
participants will select how to invest their account
balances.  An individual will be able to invest in up
to five domestic or international funds that are
registered to do business in Sweden.
1 9 Funds that
wish to participate must sign a contract with the
PPM.  The contract governs the fee structure for
the fund, reporting requirements, and the informa-
tion that the fund has to provide to participants.
1 7 For example, in Chile administrative expenses were 15.6
percent of contributions in 1997 (Mitchell 1998).  
1 8 C u r r e n t l y, employers pay Social Security contributions on the
aggregate wage sum on a monthly basis.  It is not possible to
separate what a given individual has contributed until tax forms
have been filed.
1 9 The first investment elections were scheduled to take place 
in 1999.  However, the implementation of the administrative
systems at the PPM has been delayed.  The implementation was
more complex than anticipated, and the original timeframe could
not be kept.  The fee schedule is complex.  Funds will
charge the same fees for participants in the
pension system as in private markets.  But since
most of the administration of the accounts is
undertaken by the PPM, the actual cost for the
fund managers should be lower than in the private
markets.  Therefore, funds have to rebate the PPM
a share of the fees, and the PPM then passes on
the savings to participants.  The size of the rebate 
is set by a formula and is determined by the fees
the fund charges and the size of the fund; popular
funds and high-cost funds have to pay a larger
rebate.  The rebate is then distributed among
workers.  The main part of the total rebate will be
distributed to participants based on the fees for the
funds that the participants have chosen.  
The remaining part of the rebate will be divided
equally among all participants.  A result of the fee
structure is that high-fee funds will pay relatively
more in rebates than what their customers will
receive in return.  The fee structure creates an
incentive for workers to participate in low-fee
funds, and for high-fee funds not to participate in
the system.  In addition to management fees, an
asset-based annual fee will be levied on partici-
pants for the administration of the funded pillar.
For individuals who do not make a choice, an
additional AP fund will serve as a default option.
The investment allocation for the default option is
still being discussed but will be weighted toward
low-risk investments.  As an alternative choice 
to private funds, a government fund will be
established.  Workers are allowed to change funds
at any time but must bear the cost of the switch,
which is estimated to be about 75 crowns ($10).
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The contributions will be invested by the 
PPM in lump sums; hence the fund companies
will only know the total investment of pension
contributions, not who the individual investors are.
The PPM will keep all account records and is also
responsible for distributing year-end account
statements.  At retirement, any time after age 61,
the account balance will be converted to either a
fixed or variable annuity with survivor options
using standard insurance practices.  The PPM 
will be the sole provider of annuities.  
The Guarantee Pension
The guarantee pension is a means-tested benefi t ,
payable at age 65.  The guarantee pension is offset
by the income pension an individual collects; at
low levels of income pension, the offset is one-for-
one and then declines.  Figure 1 illustrates how the
guarantee pension is determined (the amounts
refer to a single individual).  The pension benefi t
is expressed in base amounts, a reference amount
that is used for all social insurance programs 
to establish benefits, pension rights, etc.
2 0
Individuals with an income pension of 1.26 base
amounts or lessÑequivalent to approximately 
20 percent of the average wageÑreceive the base
guarantee pension of 2.13 base amounts (about
one-third of the average wage).  Ma r r i e d
individuals receive 1.9 base amounts.  If the
income pension is between 1.26 base amounts 
and 3.07 base amounts (45 percent of the average
wage), the worker receives the earned income
pension plus a share of the guarantee pension.
Because the guarantee pension is quite generous,
estimates show that approximately 40 percent of
retirees will collect at least some pension income
from the guarantee benefit (Ministry of Health and
Social Affairs 1994).  
2 0 The base amount is adjusted annually for price increases.
In 1999, the base amount was 36,400 crowns (about $4,550).The purpose of the guarantee pension is to
ensure income security in old age.  Ho w e v e r, the
design of the guarantee pension distorts the link
between contributions and benefits under the
NDC.  For individuals with very low income,
contributions are a pure tax since the basic
guarantee is paid out irrespective of work effort.
For individuals receiving part of their benefit from
the income pension and part from the guarantee
pension, an increase in work effort will not
increase the benefit one-for-one (see Figure 1).
Women are most likely to be affected by this
provision, since women on average earn less than
men and often work part-time.  Unlike the income
pension, the guarantee pension will be indexed 
to prices.  This implies that real wage growth will
reduce the share of the guarantee in total pension
income over time.
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Tr a n s i t i o n
The new system became effective in 1999 with the
first benefit payments scheduled in 2001.  The
transition to the new system will be implemented
over 16 years (originally the transition period was
20 years, but was shortened as the reform was
delayed).  The first group to participate in the new
pension system is the cohort born in 1938, and
individuals born in 1954 or later will participate in
the new system only.  Table 2 shows how the new
system will be phased in.  
Table 2: Percent of Pension Benefit Received from New
System 
Birth Ye a r Benefits from new system
Before 1938 receive full benefit from old system
1 9 3 8 20 percent
1 9 4 7 50 percent
1 9 5 3 95 percent
1954 and later 100 percent 
Although individuals born in the late 1940s
and early 1950s will get 50 percent or more of their
pension benefits from the new system, many of
their decisions about labor supply (these genera-
tions have already been in the workforce for 20
years or more) and savings have been made under
the old system.  In part for this reason, the pension
rights for the transition generations earned in the
old system until 1994 are guaranteed in the event
their benefits under the new system are lower.  It
is not until around the year 2040 that benefits will
be paid completely from the new system.
In 2015, soon after the baby boom generation
has begun to retire, even though new retirees will
get most of their benefits under the new system, a
large share of benefits will still be paid from the
old system.  Also, financial pressures will remain
because of the relative size of the baby boom
generation, and there are projected deficits in the
new pension system.  In order to cover these
d e ficits, the buffer funds play a crucial role.  
Figure 1: Offset Between Income Pension and Guarantee
Pension (in Base Amounts)
Income Pension
Fo
p e r c e n
Total Pension
3 . 0 7
2 . 1 3
0
3 . 0 7 1 . 2 6 0The Role of the Buffer Funds in the
New Pension System
The amounts accumulated in the buffer funds (the
AP funds) play an important role in the implemen-
tation of the new pension system.  In the short
term, the funds will alleviate pressures on the
general budget from the reform.  In the long term,
the buffer funds are needed to cover expected
d e ficits in the financing of benefits when the large
baby boom generation starts to retire in 2010.  
The transition to the new pension system puts
an increased burden on the general budget.  Se v e r a l
programs (the guarantee pension, disability pension,
and survivor pension) that previously were fi n a n c e d
through payroll taxes will now be financed through
general tax revenues.  In addition, the cost for
pension rights earned during military service and
child care years will be financed from general tax
revenues.  In order to offset this burden, funds will
be transferred from the AP funds to the general
budget in 1999, 2000, and 2001.  The amount is
equal to a one-time transfer of about one-third of 
the balance in the funds (258 billion crowns).
2 1
Given the importance of the buffer funds for
the stability of the system, the governance and
investment rules for the AP funds have been
r e e v a l u a t e d .
2 2 The AP funds have, in the past,
been criticized for sacrificing returns in order to
achieve political goals, in particular subsidizing
housing.  Beginning in 2001, investment
guidelines require that investments be made on
risk and return considerations only. The new
investment rules will also allow a larger share to 
be invested in equities and international assets.
2 3
The members of the investment boards are
appointed by the government and selected on 
the basis of financial competence.
2 4
Will the Reform Achieve 
Its Goals? 
One of the most important objectives of the
pension reform was to design a pension system
that would be financially stable over time, even
when faced with the most adverse demographic
and economic developments.  Furthermore, the
system should be fair in its treatment of indi-
viduals with different earnings histories but also
provide income security in old age.  The pension
reformers wanted to design a system in which
contributions determined benefits.  This would
argue for a defined contribution plan.  At the same
time, it was decided that the system should remain
pay-as-you-go in order to avoid a major tax
increase.  The result is an innovative hybrid, the
notional defined contribution plan.  Will the NDC,
as it is implemented in Sweden, achieve its goals? 
Financial Stability
The long-term financial stability of the system is
ensured by linking earned pension rights and
indexation to economic growth.  Furthermore, the
calculation of benefits is indexed to life expectancy.
Ho w e v e r, the system is still a pay-as-you-go system;
the government has to cover its pension liability
through annual contributions.  This makes the
system sensitive to cyclical demographics and
changes in the fertility rate.  Sweden has
accumulated buffer funds to cover projected
d e ficits, but if these prove inadequate, Sweden may
have to issue debt.  Increasing the contribution
rate is not a viable option in the NDC framework
since it automatically increases benefit promises.
In designing an NDC, it is therefore important 
that the contribution rate is set to ensure fi n a n c i a l
stability in the long run.  Simulations done for
Sweden show that the system will be stable in the
long run at the set contribution rate of 18.5 percent
( Palmer 1998).  
2 1 An additional transfer in 2005 has been approved if needed;
h o w e v e r, the total transfer cannot exceed 350 billion crowns 
(as a one-time transfer).  
2 2 In the new organization, Funds 1-5 will be reorganized into
four funds of equal size.  Fund 6 will remain.  Each fund has its
own investment board.
2 3 At least 30 percent of each fund has to be invested in interest-
earning assets.  Each fund can own no more than 2 percent of 
the total value of the companies listed on the Stockholm Stock
Exchange and no more than 10 percent of a given company.  No
more than 40 percent of the assets can be exposed to currency
risk.  
2 4 The newly elected chairman of one of the AP funds resigned
after he was criticized for not having sufficient qualifications.
12A potential source of fiscal instability in the
design is the fact that the rate of return on pension
rights is tied to per capita wage growth rather than
total wage growth.  An automatic adjustment, the
Ò b r a k e,Ó will be applied to the rate of return and
indexation if the financial stability of the system is
threatened.  This feature protects the financing but
may expose the system to a higher degree of
political risk (Disney 1998).
Fairness and Redistribution
The notional defined contribution system creates a
clear link between contributions and benefits.  In
contrast to the ATP system, benefits in the new
pension system are determined by lifetime
contributions.  At retirement, the income pension
is neutral to the choice of work and leisureÑthe
increase in benefits from an additional yearÕs work
is actuarially fair.  Ho w e v e r, for workers in the
lower half of the wage distribution, the link
between contributions and benefits is blurred
because of the offset between the income pension
and the guarantee pension.  For these individuals,
additional work does not necessarily increase
pension benefits one-for-one.  The choice of
retirement age is also less flexible for the group
dependent on the guarantee, since it is only
payable from age 65.
Redistribution is an important goal in
S w e d e nÕs pension policy, and the desire to create a
clear link between benefits and contributions has
been combined with the redistribution goals.  The
guarantee pension ensures income security for
individuals with no or low incomes.  Ho w e v e r,
some of the contributions for individuals who
receive both the guarantee and the income pension
are a pure tax.  The system also redistributes
income from high earners by putting a ceiling on
earnings used in determining benefits but levying
the employer payroll tax on full earnings.  Overall,
the new pension system creates a more systematic
and equitable distribution of contributions and
b e n e fits.  
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Conclusion 
The Swedish experience with pension reform
provides some important lessons.  The reform
process took almost a decadeÑreaching consensus
was sometimes difficult.  The design, the notional
d e fined contribution plan, is new and, following
Sweden, several other countries have adopted
similar systems.  Is the NDC plan a model to
f o l l o w ?
Tr a n s i t i o n
One of the main reasons for reform was the
sensitivity of the old pension system to economic
growth.  The new pension system is tied to
economic growth, making it financially stable in
the long run.  Ho w e v e r, it does not solve the
financial pressures associated with the retirement
of the large baby boom generation since the
system is still financed on a pay-as-you-go basis.
The transition to the new pension system is made
possible by the fact that Sweden has accumulated
large reserves in order to meet pension obligations
for the baby boom generation.
Benefits  
Pension benefits in the NDC plan are determined
by how much is contributed over the individualÕ s
lifetime.  The focus on contributions makes the
b e n e fit side less transparent in the new pension
system.  In the old system, the benefit formula
clearly indicated the replacement rate, and it was
relatively easy for workers to estimate expected
b e n e fits at retirement.  This estimation is much
more difficult in the new system.  Fu r t h e r m o r e ,
b e n e fits are indexed to life expectancy and, as
individuals live longer, annual benefits will be
lower for a given retirement age.  This means 
that individuals have to work longer and save 
more on their own to provide for retirement.  
Part of the benefits (although a small part) is 
also directly dependent on investment choices 
that individuals make.Information and Education  
Overall, the new system puts more responsibility
on individuals to plan and prepare for retirement.
Information and education therefore become
crucial components of the system.  In order to
inform and educate the population about the new
pension system, the National Social Insurance
Board launched a large information campaign
during 1999.  All citizens received information
materials in the mail with an annual statement of
expected pension benefits.  A survey by the
National Social Insurance Board indicates that a
majority of households had read the information
materials but that only one-third of households
had some knowledge about the new pension
system and very few households had detailed
knowledge (von Zweigbergk 1999).  This result
may not be surprising since the new So c i a l
Security system has just started.  The challenge
will be to increase knowledge of the new pension
system over the next few years.
2 5 Ad d i t i o n a l
information campaigns will follow in 2000 and
2001, and, as part of the system, participants will
receive annual statements of their account balance
both in the notional account and the funded
a c c o u n t .
For the funded component, additional infor-
mation on fund choices, investment risk, and fees
will be provided.  Since the investment choice has
been delayed until the fall of 2000, it is unclear
how well workers will understand this component
and how they will invest.  The Swedish experience
will provide lessons about investment behavior 




The new system includes a funded pillar in which
individuals can direct their own investments.
Since the funded pillar is small, it will be crucial
for the system to be efficient and administrative
costs to be low.  The operation and costs of the
Premium Pension Agency will provide important
lessons on the possibility of introducing a funded
pillar of this size.  Ho w e v e r, the proposed fee
structure is complex, which suggests that the most
likely funds to participate will be bond funds,
large-cap funds, and index funds.  In this case, a
more efficient and less costly way to organize the
accounts could have been to implement a
centralized system with a limited set of investment
o p t i o n s .
2 6
Fi n a l l y, an important issue in implementing 
a system like SwedenÕs, is to what extent workers
will understand the difference between the NDC
(the virtual account) and the funded account
(Diamond 1999).  Workers pay into both of the
accounts and may not be able to differentiate
between the two.  In particular, if the rate of return
is higher in the funded account than in the NDC
account, there could be political pressures to
increase the size of the funded component.  
25 Experience from the United States with employer-provided
pensions indicates that workers in general have little knowledge
about their pension plans even after participating for several
years (Mitchell 1988, Starr-McCluer and Sundn 1999, Gustman
and Steinmeier 1999).
2 6 An example of this type of system is the Thrift Savings Plan
(TSP) in the United States, a defined contribution plan for
federal government employees with more than 2 million
participants.  The TSP currently has three investment options,
and the fund managers were selected in a competitive bidding
process.  The cost of investment management is very low, about
1 basis point, and the overall administrative cost is about $20
per participant per year.References
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